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The Constitution of the Northern Mariana
Islands: Does A Different Cultural Setting
Justify Different Constitutional Standards?
JAMES A. BRANCH, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this article is to examine certain constitutional
questions that recently have been raised by Howard Willens and De-
anne Siemer' concerning the constitution of the Northern Mariana
Islands.' Essentially, Willens and Siemer assert that certain consti-
tutional "innovations" are justified in a United States territory, such
as the Northern Marianas, which these authors argue have different
social and economic values from the mainland.3 In their article, two
"innovations" contained in the constitution of the Northern Mariana
Islands are discussed in detail, which Willens and Siemer argue are
justified in light of the "cultural setting."' Specifically, these "justi-
fied" constitutional "innovations" include: (a) a provision for the
composition of the Northern Mariana's Senate which is not based on
* Assistant Professor, University of Denver College of Law. LL.M., University
of Georgia; J.D., University of New Mexico; B.A., University of New Mexico.
1. Willens & Siemer, The Constitution of the Northern Mariana Islands: Consti-
tutional Principles and Innovations in a Pacific Setting, 65 GEo. L. J. 1373 (1977).
Howard P. Willens and Deanne C. Siemer have both worked in the Northern Mari-
anas as consultants. Willens is an attorney with Wilmer, Cutter & Pickering, and
Siemer is an attorney for the Department of Defense.
2. The constitution was ratified on March 6, 1977. The Northern Marianas will
have a commonwealth status with the United States similar to that of Puerto Rico.
See notes 18 and 19 infra.
3. One may wonder how different these values really are since as early as 1961
the people of the Northern Marianas have wanted to be closely associated with the
United States. On February 5, 1961 the people conducted their own plebiscite and of
a total of 2,847 registered voters, 1,557 voted for unification with Guam (and thus
association with the United States) and 818 voters opted for annexation by the United
States. See M. WHrrEMAN, 1 IG. INT'L L. 813 (1963); and Green, Termination of the
US. Pacific Islands Trusteeship, 9 Tax. INr'L L. J. 175, 180 (1974) where the author
points out: "This action [separate petition to the United States] characterizes a culture
considerably more westernized than its ethnic counterparts to the southwest and
southeast." (Emphasis added.)
4. In fact, the cultural setting is quite similar to that of the mainland. Christian-
ity is the predominant religion with 98% of the people belonging to the Catholic faith.
The schools are similar to American schools and English is the common language. In
addition, many of the work habits of the people are very American. See generally S.
DE SMrrH, MICROSTATES AND MICRONESIA (1970); and C. HEmi, MICRONESLA AT THE
CROSSROADS (1974). This author, having lived in New Mexico and Saipan, found the
Chamorro culture of Saipan very similar to the Spanish-American culture of New
Mexico.
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population; 5 and (b) a provision providing for nonalienation of prop-
erty to persons of other than "Northern Marianas descent."
'
Willens and Siemer find support for their position in the doc-
trine of "incorporation, "I a doctrine which evolved during a series of
cases heard between 1901 and 1922 and which, collectively, have be-
come known as the Insular Cases.' The doctrine of incorporation
states that the United States Constitution does not "follow the flag"'
and does not apply fully to offshore territories unless (or until) such
territories are "incorporated" into the Union. The Court has never
precisely defined when a territory is "incorporated,"' 0 and to date it
has only once found an outlying territory to be "incorporated.""
Although Willens and Siemer acknowledge that the provisions
of the Northern Marianas constitution, dealing with the composi-
5. MARIANAS CoNsT. art. 11, § 2 (a), provides in part:
The Senate shall consist of nine members with three members elected at
large from each of three districts. The first Senatorial district shall con-
sist of Rota, the second Senatorial district shall consist of Tinian and
Aguiauan, and the third Senatorial district shall consist of Saipan, and
the islands north of it.
6. MAIANAS CONST. art. XII, § 1 provides: "The acquisition of permanent and
long term interest in real property within the Commonwealth shall be restricted to
persons of Northern Marianas descent."
7. The term "incorporation" has never been defined by the Court; Justice Harlan
in his dissent in Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 391 (1901), thought it had some
"occult" meaning and was "enveloped in some mystery which he was unable to
unravel."
- 8. These cases include: De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901); Downes v. Bid-
well, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903); Dorr v. United
States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904); Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905); and
Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922). The name Insular apparently refers to the
fact that the territories in these cases were island possessions of the United States.
The exact source of the title is unknown, although the cases were so called by legal
writers as early as 1901. See Randolph, The Insular Cases, 1 CoLum. L. Rav. 436
(1901).
9. This expression of the "constitution following the flag" originated with Wil-
liam Jennings Bryan in the election of 1900 when he campaigned against "imperial-
ism." W. KING, MRLVnII. Ws'roN Fuu.La, Csmn Juascz op Tm UNrrED STATEs 1888-
1910 at 262-68 (1967).
10. Frederick Coudert, who was the attorney for the plaintiffs in the De Lima
and Downes cases has suggested that Justice White considered a promise of statehood
implicit in the concept of "incorporation." See Coudert, The Evolution of the Doc-
trine of Territorial Incorporation, 26 COLUM. L. REv. 823, 834 (1926). This observation
is supported by Chief Justice Taft's statement in Balzac, 258 U.S. at 311 where he
stated: "Incorporation has always been a step, and an important one, leading to
statehood."
11. Alaska was found to be an "incorporated" territory in the Rassmussen case,
197 U.S. at 525.
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tion of the senate and the "nonalienation of land," are in violation of
the United States Constitution,"2 they argue that the provisions are
justified in light of the "Pacific setting" involved since the Constitu-
tion does not apply fully to this territory under the doctrine of "in-
corporation."' 3 Their position is further predicated on the assump-
tion that the provisions in question do not affect "fundamental
rights," since certain "fundamental rights" guaranteed by the Con-
stitution have been held to apply to the territories regardless of
whether the territory in question has been "incorporated."'"
This paper will examine the soundness of these "innovations"
which have been justified by Willens and Siemer in the above argu-
ments. First, the concept of "incorporation" as a constitutional doc-
trine in the modem world"5 will be evaluated. In discussing this doc-
trine (and the Insular Cases) the leading case of Downes v. Bidwell'
will be carefully reviewed. It was in the Downes case that Mr. Jus-
tice White originally planted the seeds for the doctrine of "incorpo-
ration," although Mr. Justice Harlan wrote a vigorous dissent point-
ing out some of the mischiefs of the doctrine. Some emphasis will be
placed on Harlan's dissent as, in terms of individual rights, it is the
sounder of the two opinions. Some later cases will also be discussed
which generally involve similar issues in a different setting, such as
the rights of Americans abroad 7 and the rights of resident aliens.
Second, the question of whether the United States Constitution
should fully apply to the new Commonwealth of the Northern Mari-
anas will be examined. 8 Since the "cultural setting" is important to
12. Willens & Siemer, supra note 1, at 1391, 1392.
13. Id. at 1412.
14. The Court in Balzac stated: "[Clertain fundamental personal rights de-
clared in the Constitution, as for instance that no person could be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law, had from the beginning full application
in the Philippines and Porto Rico . 258 U.S. at 312-14.
15. The "modern world" is used here to distinguish the present from the world of
1901. It is intended to suggest that with modern transportation, communication, and
technology, the territories cannot be considered far. away and isolated as they no
doubt were in 1901. Thus, it is further suggested that to the extent any such sense of
remoteness influenced the Court's decisions in the Insular Cases, it should no longer
have a bearing on future decisions.
16. 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
17. Some writers have referred to these cases as the "new" Insular Cases. A.
KELLY & W. HARISON, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, 1TS ORIGINS AN) DEvELoPMENr
818 (1976).
18. The form of Association which exists between the Northern Marianas and the
United States is that of a Commonwealth and is similar to that of Puerto Rico. The
Supreme Court has said that Puerto Rico "occupies a relationship to the United States
1980
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any discussion of this question, the geography and history of the
Northern Marianas are briefly reviewed so as to acquaint the reader
with this "cultural setting."
Next is discussed the two provisions of the constitution of the
Northern Marianas which set forth the present constitutional chal-
lenges: the nonalienation of land provision and the unequal repre-
sentation provision. The argument will be made that these constitu-
tional "innovations" are not justified in a modern "Pacific setting"
because: (a) the doctrine of "incorporation" is not a sound constitu-
tional principle; (b) the rights affected by these "innovations" are
"fundamental" and the United States Constitution would apply
fully to protect such rights; and, (c) as a purely practical matter, the
"innovations" will not accomplish the purposes for which they were
intended, regardless of the constitutional questions.
It is the author's position that the provision relating to unequal
representation, which would violate principles of one person one
vote, is unconstitutional and cannot be cured except by compliance
with the principles set forth in Reynolds v. Simms."j The provision
relating to nonalienation of land is likewise unconstitutional, but the
general principles and goals of this provision can effectively be im-
plemented in appropriate legislation which would not contain uncon-
stitutional prohibitions. Several suggestions for such legislation are
included.
Further, the author wishes to point out that his paper does not
attempt to discuss or resolve the question of what would be the ef-
fect on the covenant between the Northern Marianas and the United
States should, in fact, these provisions be found to be unconstitu-
tional. It is hoped that that will be the topic of a subsequent paper.
Rather, the principal purpose of this paper is to indicate the
problems inherent in the rationale of the Insular Cases.
Finally, it should be clearly stated that it is not the author's
position that a different cultural setting does not at times justify dif-
ferent rules of law that reflect different social norms. However, once
that has no parallel in our history." Examining Bd. of Eng'rs v. Flores de Otero,
426 U.S. 572, 596 (1976). Puerto Rico is an "organized" (operating under Organic
Act of Congress), "unincorporated" territory. See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298.
For more information about the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the territories in
general, see Leibowitz, The Applicability of Federal Law to the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, 56 GEO. L. J. 219 (1967); Comment, The Constitution Abroad: The
Operation of the Constitution Beyond the Continental Limits of the United States, 32
'fTx. L. REv. 58 (1953); Willens & Siemer, supra note 1, at 1383 n.41; and Green,
supra note 3, at 187.
19. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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a society, such as the Northern Marianas, freely chooses to become a
"part" of the United States, and its inhabitants freely choose to be-
come citizens of the United States, then the application of the Con-
stitution should not be the subject of negotiation. In such a situa-
tion, deviations from constitutional standards cannot be justified
under the guise of a "different cultural setting" merely to meet the
expedient needs of the negotiators of a covenant. In this regard, Mr.
Justice Black stated in Reid v. Covert" that "[tihe prohibitions of
the Constitution were designed to apply to all branches of the Na-
tional Government and they cannot be nullified by the Executive or
by the Executive and the Senate combined."' 2' As will be illustrated
in this paper, constitutional safeguards will do more to benefit the
culture than will deviations from constitutional standards.
II. DEFINING THE PROBLEM: THE INSULAR CASEs-WHITE's THEORY
OF "INCORPORATION" AND HARLAN'S DISSENT
The problem of whether the Constitution "follows the flag" and
applies fully to the territoriesn of the United States can best be un-
derstood by reviewing the Insular Cases decided at the turn of the
century. At the conclusion of the Spanish American War,n the
United States acquired the territories of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the
Philippines. During this same period, Hawaii became a United
States possession. 4 These new territories presented the country with
the problem of how to govern "remote" possessions,n which the Su-
preme Court was to resolve in the Insular Cases.
Today it is difficult to imagine the controversy these cases
caused at the turn of the century. They were the source of a number
20. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
21. Id. at 17.
22. The United States territories include Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands,
American Somoa, and formerly the Canal Zone. All but American Somoa are "organ-
ized" by Act of Congress. American Somoa is "unorganized" and governed by execu-
tive order. See generally Note, Executive Authority Concerning the Future Political
Status of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 66 MIcH. L. REv. 1277 (1968); and
Willens & Siemer, note 1 supra. For a discussion of the status of the Canal Zone since
the Panama Canal Treaty, see generally Note, Panama: The Proposed Transfer of the
Canal and Canal Zone by Treaty, 5 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 195 (1975).
23. The Spanish American War ended with the Treaty of Paris approved by the
Senate on April 11, 1899. See Coudert, note 10 supra.
24. Hawaii was annexed into the Union by a joint resolution in both houses of
Congress which only required a simple majority rather than the two-thirds majority of
the Senate required by a treaty. For an interesting discussion of how and why the
annexation occurred, see W. SWINDLE, COURT AND CONsTrrtu'rON IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY: THE OLD LFGALTY, 1889-1932 at 81-82 (1969).
25. See note 15 supra.
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of legal articles" and political debate," as well as the subject of some
political satire.n In much the same way that American thought was
occupied in the sixties by the war in Vietnam, and in the seventies
by inflation, in 1900 American thought centered on its new posses-
sions and the Insular Cases.
The first Insular Case to come before the Supreme Court was
De Lima v. Bidwell," heard in 1901. The case involved the status of
the territory of Puerto Rico which was acquired at the conclusion of
the Spanish American War. The issue before the Court was whether
"territory acquired by the United States by cession from a foreign
power remains a 'foreign country' within the meaning of the tariff
laws." 3 The case involved a customs agent of the Port of New York,
who, pursuant to the General Customs Administration Act of 1890,31
26. See generally Whitney, Another Philippine Constitutional Question-
Delegation of Legislative Power to the President, 1 COLUM. L. Rav. 33 (1901); Ran-
dolph, note 8 supra; and Lowell, The Status of Our New Possessions-A Third View,
13 H~Av. L. REv. 155 (1899).
27. The question of whether the Constitution "follows the flag" was an issue in
the political campaign of 1900. See W. KING, supra note 9, at 262-77.
28. An example of this political satire is the following piece by the Irish humorist
Finley Peter Dunne:
"I see," said Mr. Dooley, "th' Supreme Coort has decided th' Consitu-
tion don't foolow th' flag."
Ye can't make me think th' Consitution is goin' thrapezin' around
ivrywhere a young liftnant in th' arrmy takes it into his head to stick a
flag pole. It's too old. It's a homestayin' Consitution with a blue coat
with brass buttons onto it ..
[While everyone was waiting, the Supreme Court] "just put th'argymints
iv lamed counsel in th' ice box an' th' chief justice is in a comer writin'
a pome. Brown J. an' Harlan J. is discussin' th' condition iv th' Coort is
considerin' th' Roman Empire befure th' fire. Th' rrest iv th' Coort is
considerin' th' question iv whether they ought or ought not to wear
ruchin' on their skirts ...
Th' decision was rread by Brown J. . . .We've been strugglin' over it
iver since ye see us las' an' on'y come to a decision (Fuller C.J., Gray J.,
Harlan J., Shiras J., McKenna J., White J., Brewer J., an' Peckham J.
dissentin' fr'm [Brown J.] an' each other) ...
Some say it laves th' flag up in th' air an' some say that's where it laves
th' Consitution. Annyhow, something's in the' air. But there's wan thing
I'm sure about.
"What's that?" asked Mr. Hennessy.
"That is," said Mr. Dooley, "no matter whether th' Consitution follows
th' flag or not, th' Supreme Court follows th' illiction returns."
F. DuNNE, MR. DooLEz AT is BESr 72-77 (E. Ellis ed. 1969).
29. 182 U.S. 1 (1901).
30. Id. at 174.
31. 26 Stat. 131 (1890).
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had collected an import duty on sugar arriving from San Juan,
Puerto Rico. Since the. United States Constitution requires in
article I, section 8 that "all duties, imports, and excises shall be
uniform" throughout the land, the question arose as to whether ihe
duties in question had been imposed unconstitutionally. It was con-
ceded that the duty was not "uniform," thus leaving as the only
issue the question of whether Puerto Rico was "a port of the United
States."
The Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Brown in a five to four
decision, held that due to the previous ratification of the Treaty of
Paris, Puerto Rico was not a "foreign country" within the meaning
of the tariff laws, and therefore, the customs agent had illegally col-
lected the duties in question. This case seems to be limited to its
facts, and seems only to hold that Puerto Rico is not a foreign coun-
try under the tariff laws. However, at the same time the Court heard
the De Lima case, it also heard the arguments in the companion
case of Downes v. Bidwell.3 2
Downes also raised the-fundamental question of whether Puerto
Rico was a part of the United States. The facts of that case were
essentially the same as in De Lima, with the exception that Congress
had enacted the Foraker Actn which temporarily provided a civil
government and revenues for the island. Downes is the more inter-
esting of the two cases since it held that Puerto Rico was not a part
of the "United States" within that provision of the Constitution
which declares that "all duties, imports, and excises shall be uni-
form throughout the United States";u furthermore, it was in this de-
cision that Justice White first mentioned the concept of "incorpora-
tion."u Like De Lima, Dowries was a five to four decision, except
there was no majority opinion; instead, there were five separate con-
curring opinions" and two dissents, one with four dissenters in which
Harlan concurred, and one where Harlan wrote a separate dissent.Y
Essentially, three important interpretations emerged in the
32. 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
33. 31 Stat. 77 (1900).
34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
35. It has been suggested that the doctrine of "incorporation" was not original to
Justice White and that he borrowed the doctrine from Abbott Lawrence Lowell who
was later to become president of Harvard University. See W. KinG, note 9 suprp; and
Lowell, note 26 supra.
36. Brown, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. White, J., wrote a separate
concurring opinion in which Shiras, J., and McKenna, J., concurred. Gray, J., wrote
another concurring opinion. Fuller, C.J., wrote a dissent supported by Harlan, J.,
Brewer, J., and Peckham, J. Harlan also wrote a separate dissent. 182 U.S. at 244-47.
37. id.
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Downes decisionA' Justice Brown advocated the application of the
"extension theory" which held that the Constitution only applied to
the territories to the extent that it had been "extended" to the terri-
tories by Congress. 3' Justice White, on the other hand, advanced the
theory of "incorporation," which held that the Constitution only ap-
plied to territories which had been "incorporated" into the Union. 0
This theory was subsequently to become the unanimous rule of the
Court,' although it is not clear even today when exactly a territory
has become "incorporated" into the union." The third theory of im-
portance was that advanced by the dissenters, especially Justice
Harlan, and may be referred to as the theory of ex proprio vigore.
This theory holds that the Constitution applies of its own force to
the territories from the moment they become territories.
Since Brown's theory of "extensionism" was never recognized by
a majority of the Court, it seems to be only of historical value. In
contrast, White's concept of "incorporation" and Harlan's objections
to it have been the subject of some debate and shall now be ex-
amined in more detail.
White seemed intent on establishing that the Constitution would
not apply to the territories fully,'3 even if it meant somehow distin-
guishing Chief Justice Marshall's prior ruling that "[tihe District of
Columbia, or the territory west of the Missouri [or any territory] is
not less within the United States than Maryland or Pennsylvania."',
38. See generally Coudert, note 10 supra.
39. Congress was considered to have this power under the territory clause of the
Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
40. See notes 7 and 10 supra.
41. See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922).
42. See notes 7 and 10 supra; and text accompanying notes 44 and 45 infra.
43. White, who was appointed to the Bench by President Cleveland, was a
wealthy Louisiana sugar planter with strong protectionist tariff instincts. See A.
KELLY & W. HAxmsoN, supra note 17, at 485. Thus, if the Constitution was held to be
fully applicable to the territories, the tariff laws would not have applied to any im-
ported goods (including sugar) from the territories. That pro-protectionist instincts
influenced White's philosophy is further supported by the fact that when he was a
Senator and had just been appointed to the Bench, he refused to take his seat on the
Bench until he had finished supporting a pro-protectionist measure in the Senate. See
generally W. SwinDLE, note 24 supra; W. KING, note 9 supra; and A. KELLY & W.
HARBISON, note 17 supra.
44. In the case of Loughborough v. Blake, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 317, 319 (1920),
Chief Justice Marshall had said:
The power to lay and collect duties, imports, and excises, may be exer-
cised, and must be exercised, throughout the United States. Does this
term [the United States] designate the whole or any particular portion of
the American Empire? Certainly this question can admit but of one an-
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Although Brown had argued that Marshall's statement was mere
dictum, White found Brown's position "inadmissible" and proceeded
to distinguish Marshall's holding by finding that the Constitution
only had the "potential" to apply to the territories. 5 This idea of
"potentiality" lay at the heart of White's concept of "incorpora-
tion," (i.e., that territories only had the "potential" for constitu-
tional safeguards, and that this "potential" could only be fulfilled
when the territory was actually "incorporated" into the Union). Al-
though there is some indication that White held a conservative ra-
cial and pro-protectionist tariff philosophy which no doubt contrib-
uted to the development of the "incorporation" doctrine,'
8
nevertheless, this theory became the unanimous doctrine of the
Court within twenty years."
The chief mischief in the doctrine of "incorporation" is that it
provides for unequal treatment of citizens under the Constitution,
and results in two classes of citizenship. Thus, citizens who are for-
tunate enough to have been born on the mainland can be assured of
all the constitutional protections, while those unfortunate souls who
may have been born in a territory can never be sure that they will be
guaranteed all of the rights under the Constitution. That such a doc-
trine could have developed in light of the thirteenth, fourteenth, and
fifteenth amendments (and forty years after the Civil War) seems
inappropriate. That this doctrine is still the rule of the Court in ter-
ritorial matters in 1980 is unfortunate. The rationale for the rule has
been that it allows "semi-civilized" societies to become civilized
before adopting our legal system, and the rule is said to preserve
traditional systems and customs. These supposed benefits greatly
risk the protection of individual freedoms, as Justice Harlan pointed
swer. It is the name given to our great republic, which is composed of
States and territories. (Emphasis added.)
Further, in the case of Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, the Court had previously held
that there was a right to jury trial in the District of Columbia. Loughborough is hard
to reconcile with the Downes decision as the dissenters in Downes pointed out. 182
U.S. at 352-53. The Balzac case is likewise hard to reconcile with Callan. Id.
45. 182 U.S. at 292-344.
46. Frederick Coudert, who was attorney for the plaintiffs in Downes stated:
Mr. Justice White feared that a decision in this case in favor of the
plaintiffs might be held to confer upon the citizens of the new posses-
sions rights which could not be taken away from them by Congress. I
may say that in a conversation subsequent to the decision he told me of
this dread lest by a ruling of the Court it might have become impossible
to dispose of the Philippine Islands .... It is evident that he was much
preoccupied by the danger of racial and social questions. ...
Coudert, supra note 10, at 832.
47. 258 U.S. 298.
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out in his dissent in Downes,'4 and the remaining Insular Cases.
Another evil that Justice Harlan saw in the concept of "incorpo-
ration" was that it violated the principle of separation of powers
and, in Harlan's words, resulted in "legislative absolutism."'49 Under
the concept of "incorporation" and under the territorial clause of the
Constitution, Congress would have absolute authority in making
laws for the territories, even laws which would otherwise be uncon-
stitutional. This extraordinary power was said to exist under article
IV, section 3(a) which states: "Congress shall have Power to dispose
of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Terri-
tory or other Property belonging to the United States . . . ."" Inter-
preted in light of the concept of "incorporation," the above section
of the Constitution was held to give the Congress plenary powers to
apply otherwise unconstitutional standards to the territories. Thus,
under the guise of the doctrine of "incorporation," the people of the
various territories have been at times denied the right to jury trials,"t
the right to a grand jury indictment, 52 and other very important (if
not "fundamental") rights." Harlan foresaw these potential wrongs
in 1901.
Harlan's objections to the concept of "incorporation" are well
stated in his dissent in the Downes case. Among the evils he foresaw
included the implicit colonialism5' involved in such a concept, the
danger of legislative absolutism,3 and the fact that such a "vague"
48. 182 U.S. at 375-91.
49. Id. at 379.
50. U.S. CONsTr. art. IV, 3, cl. 2.
51. Puerto Rico was denied this right in Balzac, 258 U.S. 298.
52. See Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, which held that the fifth and sixth amendment
right to a grand jury proceeding and a unanimous verdict in criminal cases did not
apply to the territory of Hawaii.
53. Implicit in all the Insular Cases is the right to equal protection and due
process.
54. Harlan stated:
The idea that this country may acquire territories anywhere upon the
earth, by conquest or treaty, and hold them as mere colonies or prov-
inces-the people inhabiting them to enjoy only such rights as Congress
chooses to accord them-is wholly inconsistent with the spirit and genius
as well as with the words of the Constitution.
182 U.S. at 380.
55. In this regard, Harlan stated: "[If Congress has plenary powers over the
territories] . . . We will, in that event, pass from the era of constitutional liberty
guarded and protected-by a written constitution into an era of legislative absolutism."
Id. at 379.
56. Harlan stated that "[monarchical and despotic governments, unrestrained
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concept could only result in subjecting the people of the territory to
an arbitrary and despotic rule.57 Harlan, known as "the great dis-
senter," continued to voice his objection to this concept while he re-
mained on the Court." It was only after he had left the Bench that
the Court was able to obtain a unanimous vote which made this con-
cept of "incorporation" a doctrine of the Court.
9
The inherent weaknesses in the doctrine of "incorporation" be-
gan to develop in the cases which came to the Court after Downes.
The first of these was the case of Hawaii v. Mankichi,10 a habeas
corpus proceeding on behalf of Mankichi who had been tried without
the benefit of a grand jury indictment, and convicted by less than a
unanimous verdict (nine out of the twelve jurors). Again, White ar-
gued his concept of "incorporation" and once again, Harlan dis-
sented.6 Although White's argument prevailed, Harlan, in his dis-
sent argued that the concept of "incorporation" was an
insupportable solution 2 to a complex problem which could only re-
sult in the subjugation of the inhabitants of the territories who
would be "controlled as Congress may see fit, not as the Constitution
requires, nor as the people governed may wish.""
By the time the case of Dorr v. United StatesU' was heard in
1904, Justice Holmes had taken the place of Justice Shiras and Jus-
tice Day had replaced Justice Gray. The Dorr case involved the right
of an accused to a jury trial in the Philippines. This decision repre-
by written constitutions, may do with newly acquired territories what this Govern-
ment may not do consistently with our fundamental law." Id. at 380.
57. Id. Justice Black seems to have shared these fears as will be pointed out in
the discussion of Reid v. Covert, infra.
58. Harlan served on the Couit from 1877-1911, during which time he heard
14,226 cases, and delivered the majority opinion of the Court in 745 cases and dis-
sented in 380 cases. He was accordingly known as "the great dissenter." Despite hav-
ing been a slave-holder in the early years of his life, he became a great man of liberal
principles. He participated in 39 cases dealing with civil rights of Blacks, and in every
case in which the Court upheld the rights of Blacks, Harlan voted with the majority,
whereas he dissented in every case in which the Court declared federal civil rights
legislation to be unconstitutional. See F. LTHAM, THE GREAT DISSENTER, JOHN MA-
SHALL HARLAN, 1833-1911 at 160 (1970).
59. Id.
60. 190 U.S. 197.
61. Brown delivered the opinion of the Court, and White and McKenna joined in
a separate concurring opinion. Id. at 218. Fuller wrote a dissent joined by Harlan,
Brewer, and Peckham. Id. at 221. Harlan again wrote his own separate dissent. Id. at
226.
62. Id. at 244.
63. Id. at 240.
64. 195 U.S. 138.
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sented the first time that the concept of "incorporation" was to re-
ceive a clear majority vote of the Court in the Insular Cases. Justice
Day wrote the opinion of the Court which illustrated that White's
concept of "incorporation" was becoming the accepted doctrine of
the Court. The Court held that Congress had complete authority
over the territories under article IV, section 3 of the Constitution, and
that the "Constitution does not, without legislation and of its own
force, carry such rights [to a jury trial] to territory so situated [i.e.,
not "incorporated"]." 65 Commenting on the fact that the right to a
trial by jury was imported to protect individual freedom, Harlan cited
Blackstone's observation that "Rome, Sparta and Carthage, at the
time their liberties were lost, were strangers to the trial by jury.""
Between 1904 and 1922 there were other cases which dealt with
the question of whether the Constitution "follows the flag," but it
was clear after Dorr that White's theory of "incorporation" had won
the day. One case decided during this period, Rassmussen v. United
States,67 was especially interesting since it was the only case in
which the Court held a territory to be "incorporated" into the
Union. Rassmussen held that the territory of Alaska had been "in-
corporated" into the Union as evidenced by the language contained in
the treaty with Russia.68
In 1922, the Insular Cases finally came to a close with Chief Jus-
tice Taft's" opinion in Balzac v. Porto Rico,"0 which received the
unanimous support of the Court. In this case the Court held that the
right to a jury trial did not extend to Puerto Rico since Puerto Rico
was not an "incorporated" territory. Thus, by 1922 the concept of
"incorporation" had become a doctrine of the Court and it was to
remain the dogma of the Court until the present time.
III. RELATED CASES AND PRINCIPLES: AMERICANS ABROAD AND
RESIDENT ALIENS
Between 1922 and the present, there were several cases decided
by the Court which raised constitutional questions similar to those
raised in the Insular Cases, but in a different context. Some of these
65. Id. at 149.
66. Id. at 157, quoting 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIEs 379.
67. 197 U.S. 516.
68. Id. at 521. It should be noted that Harlan actually wrote a separate concur-
ring opinion in this case. Id. at 525.
69. Interestingly, at one time Chief Justice Taft had served as the governor of the
Philippines and had imposed the Philippine tariffs, and had drafted the congressional
acts which ratified them. W. KING, supra note 9, at 276.
70. 258 U.S. 298.
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later cases arose during the "Cold War" and were the product of
stationing large numbers of American soldiers and their dependents
on foreign soil. The issue generally involved in these cases was
whether the Constitution "followed the flag" and provided rights for
Americans stationed overseas.
The first of these cases was United States ex rel. Toth v.
Quarles,7 decided in 1955. The defendant in this case was accused of
murdering a civilian while stationed in Korea. The defendant was
arrested after he returned to the United States and after he had
been honorably discharged from the service. Nonetheless, the mili-
tary tried him under article 3(a) of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice Act of 1950.72 This Act permitted the trial of former service-
men who had committed crimes while in the service. Thus, the issue
was whether this congressional act was constitutional to the extent
that it allowed the overseas trial of civilians by a court-martial. The
Court found the Military Justice Act unconstitutional in this
context.
The next case which involved American civilians overseas was
the case of Reid v. Covert. 3 Reid is an important case in two re-
gards: first, it holds that certain "fundamental" rights are to be ac-
corded American citizens even in a "foreign" context; and second, it
holds that treaties are subject to constitutional limitations. For our
purposes, the first holding is the more significant as it seems to im-
ply that the Constitution at least "follows the citizens" in certain
situations, even if it does not always "follow the flag."
The facts in Reid involved a civilian wife of military personnel
who was accused of murdering her husband while stationed overseas.
Pursuant to a Status of Forces Agreement (an executive agreement)
she was to be tried by a court-martial which would have denied her
certain constitutional rights. Justice Black, writing the opinion of the
Court, found that, as to American citizens, certain "fundamental
rights" did apply even on foreign military bases, and that to try such
citizens by a court-martial would deprive a U.S. citizen of due
process." Although Reid did not overrule the Insular Cases, Justice
Black, in his opinion, stopped one step short of overruling them.
Harlan's view of the Insular Cases was apparently shared by
71. 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
72. Now known as the Military Justice Act of 1968, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1976).
73. 354 U.S. 1 (1957). The case was heard with the companion case of Kinsella v.
Krueger, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
74. There was no majority in Reid. Black, J., wrote the opinion of the Court
which was joined by Warren, C.J., Douglas, J., and Brennan, J.
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Mr. Justice Black where, in attempting to distinguish the Insular
Cases in Reid, he stated:
The "Insular Cases" can be distinguished from the present
cases in that they [the Insular Cases] involved the power of
Congress to provide rules and regulations to govern temporarily
territories with wholly dissimilar traditions and institutions
whereas here the basis for governmental power is American
citizenship. . . . Moreover, it is our judgment that neither the
cases nor their reasoning should be given any further expansion.
The concept that the Bill of Rights and other constitutional
protections against arbitrary government are inoperative when
they become inconvenient or when expediency dictates otherwise
is a very dangerous doctrine and if allowed to flourish would
destroy the benefit of a written Constitution and undermine the
basis of our Government. If our foreign commitments become of
such nature that the Government can no longer satisfactorily
operate within the bounds laid down by the Constitution, that
instrument can be amended by the method which it prescribes.
But we have no authority, or inclination to read exceptions into it
which are not there."5 (Emphasis added.)
If, as Black gays, congressional measures were to be of a "tem-
porary" nature, such measures can no longer be justified in the
"modem world." Furthermore, if citizenship is the sine qua non of
applying the Constitution to the territories, then there is no justifica-
tion for denying the full application of the constitution of the Com-
monwealth of the Northern Marianas (or to our other territories),
and, as Black points out, inconvenience and expediency can only re-
sult in dangerous doctrine.
Thus, Black's opinion in Reid, rather than distinguishing the
Insular Cases, lend support to the position taken by Harlan in his
dissents to those cases. Both Black and Harlan seem to recognize the
inherent weakness in the underlying rationale of the Insular Cases.
Therefore, after Reid one envisions several possible classes of
citizenship being created: there is the American citizen in the Reid
class who has the right to a jury trial and the guarantee of certain
"fundamental rights" when on foreign soil; there is the American
citizen in Puerto Rico, who, under Balzac, would have some unde-
fined "fundamental rights," but not the right to a jury trial; and,
there is the "mainland" citizen who has access to all the constitu-
tional safeguards.
How do these various rights afforded "citizens" compare to the
75. 354 U.S. at 14.
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rights of "noncitizens" (aliens) residing in the United States? It is
interesting to note that one of the leading cases in this area, Wong
Wing v. United States," was decided by practically the same Court
that decided the Insular Cases." Wong Wing involved the question
of whether an alien who entered the country illegally could be con-
victed and sentenced to hard labor without a jury trial. Justice
Shiras wrote the opinion of the Court which held that the defendant
could be held for deportation without the right of a jury trial, but he
could not be held to answer to a sentence at hard labor without the
right to a jury trial. 8 It is especially noteworthy that the Court cited
with approval the case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins,7" which had held that
"the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution is not confined to
the protection of citizens." 0 In addition, the Court in Yick Wo
seemed to have elevated certain fourteenth amendment rights to a
natural right to be enjoyed by all mankind. The Court in Wong
Wing thus cited with approval the following language from Yick Wo:
It [the fourteenth amendment] says: "Nor shall any State de-
prive any person of life, liberty or property without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the law." These provisions are universal in their
application to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction,
without regard to any differences of race, of color, or nationality;
and the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection
of equal laws.8 1 (Emphasis added.)
Consequently, not only are aliens entitled to all "fundamental
rights" when they reside in the territory of the United States, but
they have been granted some not so fundamental rights as well, such
as the right to take a bar exam and be admitted to the practice of
law,12 and the right to welfare payments." If aliens have such exten-
sive rights once they come into United States territory, how can it be
argued that citizens of the United States only have certain unde-
fined "fundamental rights" if they happen to live in an "unincorpo-
76. 163 U.S 228 (1896).
77. Justice Field was on the Court when Wong Wing was heard in 1896. He was
replaced by McKenna in 1898; otherwise the composition of the Court which heard
Wong Wing was the same as the composition of the Court which heard the Insular
Cases.
78. 163 U.S. at 237.
79. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
80. Id. at 364.
81. 163 U.S. at 238, quoting Yick Wo at 369.
82. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
83. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969).
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rated," territory?
Through the doctrine of "incorporation," developed in the Insu-
lar Cases, one sees the creation of two classes of citizenship to which
the law is not equally applied. Indeed, one sees the development of a
rule of law which at times gives greater rights to aliens than to citi-
zens of the United States, and which treats both the citizen and
noncitizen inhabitants of our offshore territories with less regard
than it treats mainland aliens.14 The Court in Yick Wo certainly un-
derstood this discrepancy, and clearly argued that due process and
equal protection should be accorded to all persons found within
United States territory (and indeed all mankind). This is essentially
the same position taken by Justice Harlan in his dissents in the In-
sular Cases, and by Justice Black in Reid, and is today, the better
constitutional principle by which people should be governed. The
Rule of Law and American concepts of equal protection require
equal treatment of citizens throughout the United States-regardless
of how a geographical area is denoted-territory or state.
IV. THE CULTURAL SETTING: THE NORTHERN MARIANAS
Since the customs and traditions of the people of the Northern
Marianas play such an important role in the issue of whether certain
constitutional "innovations" make good law, a brief understanding
of those people, their history, and the geography of their islands is in
order. Only with this understanding can the constitutional dilemma
posed by the two "innovations" found in the Northern Marianas
constitution, and discussed by Willens and Siemer, be fully
appreciated.
A. A Brief Geography of the Northern Mariana Islands.
The Northern Mariana Islands consist of all the Mariana Is-
lands except Guam, which is the southernmost island in the Mariana
chain. The Marianas in turn are part of a larger island group which
is collectively known as Micronesia. Micronesia means "little is-
lands" and consists of those small islands which lie between the 1800
Meridian on the east (the international dateline) and the 1200 Me-
ridian on the west, and which lie just north of the equator. Overall,
Micronesia consists of some 2,000 islands scattered over three million
square miles of the Pacific, its population consisting of approxi-
mately 110,000 people divided into nine district cultures and
dialects.u
84. That is not to say that mainland aliens should have fewer rights, but rather,
that there should be no distinction.
85. See generally M. WHITEMAN, note 3 supra; C. HEINE, MICRONESIA AT THE
CROSSROADS (1974); and NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC ATLAS OF THE WORLD 180-81 (4th ed.
1975).
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To the extreme west of this large, vaguely defined area of Micro-
nesia lie the Palau Islands, the Yap Islands, and the Marianas; to
the extreme east lie the Marshall Islands. Between these extremes
lie, from east to west, the islands of Kosrae, Ponape, and Truk.
These islands vary from low lying coral atolls, as are found exclu-
sively in the Marshalls, to high volcanic islands with dense rain for-
est, as is found in Ponape. The Northern Marianas lie between these
geological extremes, with temperatures ranging from 70' to 850
Fahrenheit, coupled with high humidity."
The Northern Mariana Islands are comprised of some sixteen
islands located north of Guam, totalling approximately 200 square
miles in area, but which are scattered over several thousand square
miles of oceans.87 There are approximately 14,500 inhabitants who
live on the three principal islands of Saipan, Rota, and Tinian. Sai-
pan has a population of approximately 12,500; Rota, a population of
approximately 1,500; and Tinian, a population of approximately
500.8 Guam is separated from the Northern Marianas only by histor-
ical and political events, as culturally the islands are similar.8 The
original inhabitants of the Northern Marianas were the Chamorros,
and later Carolinians from the Caroline Islands to the south also set-
tled on the islands. Thus, there are two distinct indigenous popula-
tions "of Northern Marianas descent" in the Northern Marianas
which have distinctly different customs and language-the Chamor-
ros and the Carolinians." It should be emphasized that of the three
major islands in the group, Saipan is the largest island and by far
the most heavily populated."
B. A Brief History of the Northern Marianas: From the "Isle of
Thieves" to the Commonwealth
The Mariana Islands were discovered by Magellan, and when
the Chamorro population began to steal every bit of iron they could
find, he quickly named the islands "Los Ladrones," Spanish for "the
thieves."'" When Miguel Lopez de Legazpe sailed into the area in
1564 he likewise discovered that the Chamorros were very clever and
quick to apprehend commercial matters. Lopez de Legazpe related
an amusing story of how the Chamorros had cleverly filled their bas-
86. Id.
87. Id. See also Willens & Siemer, supra note 1, at 1374-75.
88. Note 85 supra. See also I. EDMONDS, MICRONESI (1974).
89. Note 85 supra.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See I. EDMONDS, note 88 supra.
52 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY
kets with rocks and covered the rocks with rice and fruit and sold
these baskets "full of food" to the Spanish."
The Marianas became an important trading station for Spain as
it lay in the trade route between New Spain (Mexico) and the Phil-
ippines. The islands, named after Queen Mariana of Austria, the
wife of Charles I of Spain, were changed from "Los Ladrones" to the
Marianas in 1568 by a Jesuit missionary to celebrate the reception
he received in Rome for having converted some 13,000 souls to the
Catholic faith. This name stuck despite the fact that Queen Mariana
had subsequently been deposed on the orders of her half-witted son
who feared she was going to poison him."
The Chamorros did not fare well under Spanish rule. Before the
Spanish came to the islands the Chamorro population had been esti-
mated as high as 100,000; by the close of the Chamorro-Spanish War
in 1685, the population had been reduced to some 5,000 Chamorros.
While some Chamorros died from European diseases which were in-
troduced into the area, it is estimated that most were killed by fight-
ing or in reprisal. Within fifty years after the Chamoro-Spanish War,
only 1,500 Chamorros remained and today there are no "true"
Chamorros who have survived the various colonial rules.
5
The Spanish rule in the Marianas came to a close at the end of
the Spanish-American War in 1898. At that time, Spain ceded
Guam to the United States, and with its coffers still empty, Spain
then sold the Northern Marianas and the Carolines to Germany for
$4.5 million." The German rule was only to last until shortly after
the outbreak of the First World War when Japan seized the islands.
At the close of the First World War, the League of Nations de-
termined that the islands of Micronesia would be administered as a
trust, to protect the dependent people who inhabited the islands. To
implement this goal, a mandate system was created by the League
in which dependent territories were put under the mandatory power
of certain countries who in turn were accountable to the League's
Permanent Mandates Commission. 8 Under this system, Japan was
given a Class C Mandate over Micronesia, including the Northern
93. Id. at 27-31. Apparently the Chamorros thought this was a great practical
joke, as when the Spanish discovered they had been tricked, they laughed and jeered.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See Dobbs, A Macrostudy of Micronesia: The Ending of a Trusteeship, 18
N.Y. L. F. 139, 141 (1972).
97. Id. at 141-42.
98. Id. See also M. WHrrz ALN, supra note 3 at 598-673.
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Marianas.19 Japan brought some economic prosperity to the North-
ern Marianas and the islands of Saipan and Tinian became large
sugar producers.' °° After withdrawing from the League of Nations in
1935, however, Japan began to fortify the islands and to prepare for
World War II. '01 The Northern Marianas were the sight of some of
the bloodiest battles Of World War II, in which many Americans,
Japanese, and Chamorros were killed, and much of the property de-
stroyed. Finally, in 1945, a B-29 by the name of the "Enola Gay"
took off from the island of Tinian and brought an end to World War
II while ushering in the atomic age.' At the end of the War, it was
the United States who became the new colonial ruler of Micronesia
and the Northern Marianas.
At the close of World War II the United States had driven the
Japanese from the islands of Micronesia at great cost and was
acutely aware of the strategic importance of these islands. 1 3 At the
same time the United States had committed itself to a policy of
"non-self aggrandizement."''0 Thus, the United States was faced
with the dilemma of not wanting to annex the islands into the
United States, while at the same time assuring itself that the islands
would never in the future fall into the hands of a potential enemy.'"
This dilemma was resolved by the creation of the "strategic trust"
under the trusteeship arrangement in the United Nations. 06
The trustieship arrangement came about in a similar manner as
had the Mandate system under the League of Nations. As with the
League of Nations' Mandate system, the trusteeship system was
designed to create a "trust" in which certain dependent territories
could be ruled by a "trustee" until such time as the dependent terri-
tory was ready for self-rule. A "trustee" would be accountable to
the United Nations Trusteeship Council for the manner in which it
administered a "trust."'0 7
Micronesia, however, was to be a "strategic" trust which meant
that the United States, as the administering authority for the trust,
would have absolute authority over this territory, since a "strategic"
99. Dobbs, note 96 supra.
100. See C. HEINE, note 85 supra, and I. EDMONDS, note 88 supra.
101. See Dobbs, note 96 supra.
102. See 1. EDMONDS, note 88 supra.
103. See C. HEINz, note 85 supra and I. EDMONDS, note 88 supra.
104. Dobbs, supra note 96, at 143-51.
105. Id. See also Green, note 3 supra, and Comment, International Law and
Dependent Territories: The Case of Micronesia, 50 TEMP. L. Q. 58 (1976).
106. Dobbs, supra note 96, at 143-51. See also M. Wir MAN, supra note 3, at
731.
107. Dobbs, supra note 96, at 143-51.
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trust came under the control of the Security Council, not the Trus-
teeship Council, and the United States had a veto power in the Se-
curity Council. Article 76 of the United Nations Charter applies to
strategic trusts and provides primarily for the furtherance of interna-
tional peace and security, making political, economic, and social
goals secondary. The Northern Marianas (and all of Micronesia),
therefore, came under United States rule at the end of World War I,
a rule which has continued to the present time.'01 It should be men-
tioned, however, that although the United States has practically ab-
solute rule over Micronesia (or the Trust Territory of the Pacific Is-
lands as it is presently known), it has only de facto sovereign powers
over the territory. The United States has never claimed de jure sov-
ereignty over the area and the question of sovereignty has never been
determined, other than holding that the United States is a "quali-
fied sovereign" as the administering. authority. 9
The United States administration in the Trust Territory has not
been altogether satisfactory, leaving some writers to refer to the
Trust Territory as "the Rust Territory," the "Bungled Trust," and
the "Trust Betrayed.""' Much of this criticism is due to the fact
that until the 1960's the United States largely ignored the area with
the exception of Bikini and Enewetok, in the Marshall Islands,
where the government removed the people from their homelands so
that they could conduct nuclear tests. During this period Saipan was
used as a base by the C.I.A. to train counter-insurgents to infiltrate
mainland China. After 1962, the United States began to take an in-
terest in the area and with this new interest came additional funding
and some improvements in services such as education and health.
Also, with this new emphasis in the Trust Territory came a greater
effort to increase the process of self-rule in the islands; as a conse-
quence, by 1965 the Congress of Micronesia was formed with elected
leaders from the various island districts."'
As early as 1961 the Marianas wanted to form a permanent rela-
tionship with the United States despite the apparent "bungling" by
the American administration."2 The reason for this desire of a close
relationship with the United States by the inhabitants of the North-
108. Id.
109. Id. at 148.
110. See S. DE SMITH, supra note 4, at 133-37 ("Rust Territory"); Mink, MICRO-
NESIA: OUR BUNGLED TRUST, 6 TEx. INT'L L. F. 181 (1971); and D. McHENRY, MICRO-
NESIA: TRUST BETRAYED (1975).
111. See C. HEINE, note 85 supra; and I. EDMONDS, note 88 supra.
112. See note 2 supra. See also M. WHIrrMAN, supra note 3, at 813; and Mink,
note 110 supra.
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ern Marianas is probably due to the close ties which exist between
the people of the Marianas and their cousins in Guam."' Given the
closeness of ties which exists between members of the extended fam-
ily groups in the Marianas, it is not surprising that the people of the
Northern Marianas would seek a closer relationship with Guam and
the United States. Moreover, the people of the Marianas acquired
the religion of the Spanish and today 98 percent are Catholic,
whereas the rest of Micronesia is predominantly Protestant. Since
religion plays such an important role in the daily affairs of the
islanders throughout Micronesia, one writer has suggested that this
fact contributed substantially to the Marianas sense of separateness
from the rest of Micronesia."' Despite the frequent "bungling" by
American administrators, no doubt the people of the Northern
Marianas could see beyond this and recognized the great worth of the
constitutional freedoms which would come with an association with
the United States. After all, the "bungling" was largely due to human
error, and with local elections those "errors" could be (in theory)
easily cured. Thus, by 1975 the people of the Northern Marianas had
entered into a "Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands in Political Union with the United
States.""' 5 Finally, on March 6, 1977, the people ratified the
constitution of the Northern Mariana Islands by a 93 percent vote.,"
Given this background, the "innovations" which are contained in the
Northern Marianas constitution shall now be examined. Do these
"innovations" provide sound principles for the governing of the people
of this new Commonwealth?"7
V. THE CONSTITUTIONAL DILEMMA OF THE NORTHERN MARIANAS:
PROTECTING CUSTOMS AND LAND WHILE ASSURING INDIVIDUAL
FREEDOMS
The constitutional dilemma which exists in the Northern Mari-
anas is to find a way to protect the customs and traditions of the
people while at the same time providing the people with the same
fundamental constitutional safeguards as are enjoyed by citizens on
113. See FtruRE PoLTIcAL STATUS COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS OF Mi-
CRONESIA 33-37 (1967); Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands, 1967, 34 U.N. TCOR, Supp. 2 at 27, U.N. Doc. T/1658
(1967). See generally C. HEINE, note 85 supra; I. EDMONDS, note 88 supra; Willens &
Siemer, supra note 1, at 1378-81; and M. WHITEMAN, supra note 3, at 813-815.
114. See C. HEINE, note 85 supra.
115. See Willens & Siemer, supra note 1, at 1381.
116. Approximately 60% of eligible voters voted. Id. at 1373.
117. For a review of commonwealth status, see notes 18 and 19 supra.
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the "mainland."1"8 This is no simple task. Willens and Siemer have
suggested two "innovations" to resolve this dilemma; innovations
which would be unconstitutional on the mainland, but which they
defend by turning to the doctrine of "incorporation" and the Insular
Cases."' Although this approach is not without precedent,'12 it is an
unreasonable approach to the problem, and it is an approach which
is likely to create more problems than it will resolve.
The two provisions in question provide for disproportionate rep-
resentation in the Northern Marianas Senate, and for the nonaliena-
tion of land to persons of other than "Northern Marianas descent.''2
A person of "Northern Marianas descent" is a person who is a citi-
zen or national of the United States, who is at least one-quarter
Northern Marianas Chamorro or Northern Marianas Carolinian
blood or a combination thereof, and whose descent can be traced to
persons born or domiciled in the Northern Mariana Islands by 1950,
and who was a citizen of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
before the termination of the Trusteeship.1
2
The provision providing for unequal representation in the Sen-
ate was included to appease the Northern Marianas' voters of Rota
and Tinian who otherwise might not have joined in the formation of
the Northern Marianas.In Since each of these islands has a relatively
small population when compared with the island of Saipan, the vot-
ers apparently feared that the legislature would be controlled by
people living on Saipan. To avoid this consequence a provision was
included in the Northern Marianas constitution which provides that
both Rota and Tinian have equal representation in the Senate, the
upper house of representation in the Commonwealth. 2' Willens and
Siemer also point out that there may be some ethnic basis to the
provisions as the Tinian position was influenced by a number of
Yapese who migrated to the island following the Second World
War.Iu This provision would be unconstitutional if enacted by a
state in the Union, due to the "one person, one vote" principles of
Reynolds v. Sims,2 ' which held that the equal protection clause of
118. By citizens on the "mainland" is meant citizens of the fifty states.
119. See Willens & Siemer, supra note 1, at 1393-1412.
120. See Dobbs, supra note 46, at 178-215.
121. MARIANAS CONST. art. II, 2(a) and art. XH, 1, respectively.
122. Id. art. XII, 4. The target date for the termination of the Trusteeship
is 1981 to 1982.
123. See Willens & Siemer, supra note 1, at 1400-05.
124. MARIANAS CONST. art. H, 2(a).
125. See Willens & Siemer, supra note 1, at 1402.
126. 377 U.S. 533.
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the fourteenth amendment is violated when an individual's right to
vote is substantially diluted in comparison to the votes of other
citizens of his State. Reynolds also held that the equal protection
clause requires that both houses of a State's bicameral legislature,
such as is found in the Northern Marianas Commonwealth, be
apportioned on the basis of population.
Thus, this provision creates a dilemma in which the new citi-
zens'2 of the Northern Marianas are represented by a legislature
which would be unconstitutional on the mainland, one which results
in unequal treatment under the Constitution of the United States,
and, additionally, one which creates two classes of citizens. Willens
and Siemer do not dispute this evil, but they find justification for it
in the Insular Cases and the doctrine of "incorporation." In defense
of this provision, they cite Harlan's decision (the "Great Dissenter's"
grandson of the same name) in Reid's where he stated, in regard to
the question of whether the constitution applies fully to the territo-
ries, that this depends "upon the particular circumstances, the prac-
tical necessities and possible alternatives involved."'1' Such a stanqe
is not sufficient for several reasons.
First, the Supreme Court in the Reynolds decision specifically
held that "historical, economic or other group interests, or area
alone, do not justify deviation from the equal-population princi-
ple."'" The Court did state that some slight deviation from the
equal-population principle may be allowed. The Court, however,
clearly indicated that attempts to justify such plans on the basis
that the purpose of the plan is to insure "effective representation
for sparsely settled areas and to prevent legislative districts from
becoming so large that the availability of access of citizens to their
representatives is impaired," are "unconvincing."' 3'1 This language
would seem to be addressed to the exact situation of the North-
ern Marianas, and if the Constitution applies fully to this terri-
tory or if the right to equal representation is "fundamental," then
this provision is unconstitutional. Since both of these rights indeed
127. The Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Is-
lands in Political Union with the United States, signed on February 15, 1975, pro-
vides for United States citizenship and nationality for the people of the Common-
wealth which will come officially under United States sovereignty upon termination
of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands and termination of the Trusteeship
Agreement. See Willens & Siemer, supra note 1, at 1382-83.
128. 354 U.S. at 65.
129. Id. at 75.
130. 377 U.S. at 579-80.
131. Id. at 580.
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are fundamental, the provision is clearly unconstitutional.
Reliance on the doctrine of "incorporation" is unsound in that it
results in unequal treatment under the law and creates different
classes of citizens. The doctrine should not be allowed to support a
disparity of rights between citizens by being invoked to support a
provision which would deny citizens of equal representation, a provi-
sion which would assure unequal treatment under the law. The right
to equal representation is a "fundamental" right as guaranteed by
the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, and the Supreme Court
has so held in the Reynolds case. 3 '
In addition to the constitutional problems with the equal repre-
sentation provision, the provision also presents some serious practi-
cal problems. First, the provision, to accomplish its desired result of
enhancing the representation of the people of the islands of Rota and
Tinian, is based on a faulty premise. The false assumption is that
the populations of these two islands will remain static and that the
status quo will be preserved. However, one of the principal bargain-
ing points in the Commonwealth negotiations with the United States
was an agreement that the United States could build a large air base
on Tinian.113 Certainly, when the construction of the base begins,
large numbers of workers will move to Tinian to work on the con-
struction of the base, especially in light of the scarcity of jobs in the
territory. 13 Undoubtedly, many of these workers will take their fami-
lies with them and reside on Tinian. Further, after the completion of
such a base, no doubt many people would migrate to Tinian to set
up shops and other stores which, invariably, are established around
and in support of a military base.
When such a base is built, even if the population does not show
any shift (which is very unlikely), would the presence of the base
itself not create a situation in which the disproportionate voice held
by Tinian in the Senate would potentially only represent the interests
of a small number of people who could easily be influenced by the
132. The Court in Reynolds stated:
Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free
and democratic society. Especially since the right to exercise the franchise
in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and
political rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote
must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized. (Emphasis added.)
377 U.S. at 561-62.
See also Yick Wo where the Court characterized the "political franchise of voting,"
under certain conditions, to be "a fundamental political right, because preservative of
all rights." 118 U.S. at 370.
133. See Willens & Siemer, supra note 1, at 1400 n.11.
134. See generally C. HmNE, note 85 supra.
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United States military? Could such a small group resist the tempta-
tion to become dependent upon the huge economic input the mili-
tary would have and which interest might be reflected in the vote of
the representative? In other words, the disproportionate voice given
Tinian in the Northern Marianas Senate might lead to dispropor-
tionate influence by the proposed United States military base on
Tinian; and rather than protecting the small population of Tinian
(or other islands) relative to Saipan, the unequal representation pro-
vision may only come to exert undue influence by the military over
all of the Northern Marianas.
Hypothetically and along a similar line, what if, after some
time, many "mainland" Americans settle on Tinian, and they in
fact become the majority on the island? Would the people of the
Northern Marianas still be happy with this disproportionate
representation?
The provision for disproportionate representation should be
found to be unconstitutional as the right to equal representation is a
"fundamental" right. Moreover, such a provision cannot be de-
fended by the expedient, but unsound, doctrine of "incorporation."
The provision is based on the false premise that it will protect mi-
nority rights and customs which in turn depend upon preservation of
the status quo.
The other provision of the Northern Marianas constitution
which lends itself to question is the so-called "nonalienation of land"
provision; a provision which could prove equally as disastrous for
the people of the Marianas as the disproportionate representation
provision discussed above. The rationale behind this provision was
to protect the people from being stripped of their most precious pos-
session, their land.'3 Although somewhat paternalistic in nature, the
idea was basically humanitarian and well-intentioned. As Willens
and Siemer point out, the land alienation restrictions are designed to
"increase the participation of the islanders as entrepreneurs in eco-
nomic ventures using land, to preserve their ability to reexamine
land uses . . .as leases are terminated, and to maximize revenues
...to the Commonwealth.'
' i
135. The people of the Northern Marianas (and throughout Micronesia) have a
special relationship to their land, and family roots are historically closely tied to land
rights. Further, the people of the Northern Marianas apparently fear losing land as
their cousins in Guam did, where approximately 30% of the land is held by nonindig-
enous people. See generally C. HEiNE, note 85 supra; and I. EDMONDS, note 88 supra.
Land is also precious due to its scarcity with only 183.5 square miles available in all
the islands. Willens & Siemer, supra note 1, at 1407.
136. Willens & Siemer, supra note 1, at 1406.
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Since these land restrictions are based in fact on purely racial
considerations, and since they would deprive many sellers of access
to markets, and since they would amount to a "taking," this
nonalienation of land provision would seem to violate at least three
provisions of the United States Constitution: (a) the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment; 37 (b) the privileges and
immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment, article IV, section
2; and (c) the fifth amendment prohibition against the taking of
property without just compensation.'3
Willens and Siemer defend this provision by citing similar pro-
visions in the laws of American Samoa and Hawaii, by citing provi-
sions found in the law relating to American Indian land, and finally
by arguing that under the doctrine of the Insular Cases, the right to
equal protection and privileges and immunities are not "fundamen-
tal rights," and hence do not apply of their own force to the Com-
monwealth of the Northern Marianas.'3 ' This defense simply is not
adequate.
First, the American Samoan and Hawaiian laws to which they
cite have never been tested constitutionally. ' It is doubtful whether
such a law would be found constitutional in Hawaii, American
Samoa or the Northern Marianas, because the law takes away im-
portant property rights and would deny citizens in the Northern
Marianas (or Hawaii or American Samoa) the equal protection of
the law as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. It would also
deny them due process of law as guaranteed by the fourteenth and
fifth amendments; and, moreover, would deny them the privileges
and immunities guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.
Second, Willens' and Siemer's position that a property right
(under the equal protection clause and privileges and immunities
clauses of the fourteenth amendment) is not a "fundamental" right
is certainly questionable. Significantly, the Supreme Court stated
in Balzac, one of the Insular Cases, that property rights are
"fundamental.""'
Finally, Willens and Siemer concede that the American Indian
analogy is not on point with the situation in the Northern Marianas,
as both the Congress and the courts have traditionally considered it
137. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 4.
138. The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides in part,
"nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."
139. See Willens & Siemer, supra note 1, at 1405-12.
140. Id.
141. Note 14 supra.
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their duty to protect the Indian from exploitation from outsiders
and, further, the United States Government stands in a "guardian-
ward relationship to the tribes.""14
The "nonalienation of land" provision and the defense of the
provision by resort to the doctrine of "incorporation" results in an
expedient solution which produces poor law. If this provision is al-
lowed to stand it may do much harm. First, it emphasizes the dual-
ity of citizenship which is created by the doctrine of "incorporation."
People of "Northern Marianas descent" who are citizens of the
United States will be able to go to the mainland and purchase prop-
erty without restrictions, but citizens who are not of "Northern
Marianas descent" will not be able to go to the Northern Marianas
and purchase property. Thus, even aliens would have certain rights
on the mainland that a "mainland" citizen would not have in the
Northern Marianas.'" This provision would thus violate equal pro-
tection as well as the privileges and immunities principles of the
fourteenth amendment."' In addition, by cutting off the access of
the people to a free marketplace, the Government has in effect
"taken" the private property of the people for the public "good" (or
use), without compensation and in violation of the fifth amend-
ment.' 5 Finally, the nonalienation of land provision will not accom-
plish the goal for which it was drafted. Closing the market on land in
the Northern Marianas will not protect the people from exploitation;
rather, it will only limit exploitation to people of "Northern Mari-
anas descent." Thus, the provision would only limit any exploitation
by outsiders, and Chamorros would be free to exploit Chamorros or
Carolinians and vice versa. One could safely predict that within
some twenty-five years a majority of the land of any value would be
held by a small minority of wealthy persons of "Northern Marianas
descent." Since the marketplace would be closed to outsiders and
would not respond to a normal supply and demand curve, and since
only a small number of purchasers would have the capital to
purchase land, a seller Would have to sell at whatever price a pur-
chaser of "Northern Marianas descent" was willing to pay, which
surely would be less than the fair market value due to the scarcity of
buyers.
142. Willens & Siemer, supra note 1, at 1410.
143. See Wong Wing, 163 U.S. 228; and Yick Wo, 118 U.S. 356. See also Fujii v.
State' 38 Cal.2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952), which held, inter alia, that a state law
prohibiting sales of land to aliens was unconstitutional in that it violated the fourteenth
amendment's equalprotection clause. " '
144. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
145. U.S. CoNST. amend. V.
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It is anticipated that the argument will be made that this kind
of "local" exploitation would not occur due to the extended family
tradition and the unique setting of the islands. One need only reflect
on the effect that the Micronesian War Claims' cases had on the
extended family structure to realize what effect the accumulation of
wealth can have on the extended family structures in this setting."7
In these War Claims cases, often close family members would sue
one another over disputed shares of War Claim proceeds which one
member or group would try to hoard and not distribute in accor-
dance with the custom. These disputes would frequently result in
much bitter litigation and the disintegration of family
relationships."'
In summary, although Willens and Siemer present justifications
of the provisions in question, the provisions cannot be justified under
sound constitutional principles nor are they justified due to the "cul-
tural setting." The defense of the provisions is largely dependent
upon the doctrine of "incorporation," a doctrine which is not appro-
priate in a modem legal setting, and which, if continued, will under-
mine one of the foundations of our Republic - that all people are
equal under the law. Further, although the Supreme Court has never
stated exactly which rights are so "fundamental" that they would
apply to the territories regardless of the question of "incorporation,"
it would seem that the right to equal representation and the right to
property are so "fundamental" that they should enjoy constitutional
protection even in the territories and even in a territory that was
"incorporated." Finally, the provisions in question are not justified
as they simply will not accomplish the objectives of the drafters, re-
gardless of the merits of those objectives.
VI. ANOTHER APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM IN THE NORTHERN
MARIANAS: APPROPRIATE LEGISLATION AND A MOVE AWAY FROM
THE CONCEPT OF "INCORPORATION"
146. Micronesian Claims Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-39, 85 Stat. 92 (1971). Ter-
minated in 1976. See 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 2018-2020b (1976).
147. Under the Micronesian Claims Act of 1971, Micronesia became eligible to
make claims for damages incurred during the Second World War. Many claims were
heard by the War Claims Commission and damages awarded. Subsequently, there
arose a number of law suits, some against the Government over the fairness and
method used by the Claims Commission in arriving at awards, and others (to which
the author here refers) arose among family members over a share of the claim received
by certain heirs and not others; or heirs claiming to be the only heirs entitled to re-
ceive an award. In most cases, these disputes resulted in irreparable harm to some of
the extended families involved. This observation is based on the author's experience
as counsel for various parties in such suits during two years spent in Micronesia
working as a Legal Services Attorney and as a Public Defender.
148. Id.
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If the concept of "incorporation" is found not to be a sound con-
stitutional principle and if the provisions contained in the constitu-
tion of the Northern Marianas do not resolve the dilemma of how to
protect local custom while assuring complete constitutional freedom,
then another approach must be found to resolve the problem. Any
approach should insure that all the rights guaranteed by the United
States Constitution apply fully to citizens of the Commonwealth.
A recent case heard in the Federal Court of Appeals may indi-
cate that the legislative "absolutism" which Justice Harlan feared in
his dissent in the Insular Cases may be on the wane. The case was
the action of Ralpho v. Bell"'9 decided in 1977 which held that con-
gressional power in the territories, although broad under article IV
of the Constitution, is limited by fifth amendment due process con-
siderations. The facts of the case involved the denial of access to
certain evidence in a hearing before the War Claims Commission
which the plaintiff maintained was essential to the prosecution of his
claim against the government for damages received in World War
Il.'1 Also at issue was the question of the finality language contained
in the War Claims Act'" itself, which stated that the decisions of the
Claims Commission were final 'and not subject to appeal. "' Thus,
the issue on appeal was whether these practices resulted in a denial
of due process under the fifth amendment. In finding that due pro-
cess was violated, the court held that the powers of Congress over
the territories are not unlimited and are constrained by principles of
due process. The reasoning in Ralpho is sound and perhaps for this
reason the Government did not appeal the case. This was unfortu-
nate as this might have presented the Supreme Court with an excel-
lent opportunity to review the doctrine of "incorporation." Nonethe-
less, the case is important as it seems to put an end to Congress'
absolute control over the territories, and it seems to make a serious
inroad into the doctrine of "incorporation," and, perhaps, it may
mark a beginning of the end of the doctrine.
If indeed the doctrine of "incorporation" is on the wane, then
another method needs to be found to protect the more noble objec-
tives of the drafters of the constitution of the Northern Marianas.
Since, for reasons already stated, this writer finds the provision pro-
149. 569 F.2d 607 (1977).
150. Ralpho was seeking damages for his house which was destroyed by bombard-
ment on the island of Jaluit.
151. Pub. L. No. 92-39, § 104(a), 85 Stat. 92 (1971).
152. 569 F.2d at 618.
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viding for unequal representation unjustified in light of the cultural
setting, no attempt will be made to find an alternative to this provi-
sion. Instead, the provision should be made to comply with the one
person, one vote principle set forth in Reynolds.
Although the "nonalienation of land" provision is objectionable
as presently drafted, the idea behind the provision should be pre-
served. The attempt of the provision to assure unsophisticated in-
habitants of the islands that their land will not be bought up by
"land barons" at much less than the fair market value, and to en-
courage the people to preserve their land and customs associated
with the land represents a noble concept, worth implementing in an-
other manner. Since such "land barons" may come from within as
well as from without the society, any provisions dealing with land
ownership should not be based only on purely ethnic considerations.
Assuming the present "nonalienation of land" provision is
found to be unconstitutional by a court, or assuming it is amended
out of the constitution, then its objectives could more easily be ac-
complished by legislation. Legislation, rather than a constitutional
provision, can much better serve the needs of the people. Legislation
would be easy to change and adapt to the actual needs and circum-
stances of the society. The present constitutional provision, on the
other hand, shall require the much more difficult amendment pro-
cess to effect any change." Thus, if the present status quo should
change, or if population shifts should occur, or the demand for indig-
enous use of land change, then any legislation dealing with the prob-
lem could be readily adapted to the needs of the people, whereas the
present constitution could not. Any such legislation, however, should
not rely on the doctrine of "incorporation" or the fact that the
United States Constitution does not apply fully to the territories for
its survival.
In order to assure that the goals are met and people of the
Northern Marianas protected, such legislation might include the fol-
lowing provisions:
1. A provision which would require that all deeds involving the
sale of land be in both English and Chamorro (or other appropri-
ate native tongue).
2. A provision establishing a commission or board whose func-
tion would be to assure that native rights are protected and to
advise indigenous land owners of:
a. current appraised value of land;
b. available land;
153. MPANAs CONST. art. XVIII.
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c. alternative sources of capital (loans) should the need
for funds be the motivating factor in the land sale;
d. where to seek legal advice on land transactions; and
e. other appropriate advice.
3. A provision to publish periodic reports on land sales advising
land owners of all land sales and the amount of native lands
which have been sold to outside interests.
4. A provision which would assure that any such commission
would be so composed that it would adequately represent the
people and their interests.
5. A provision which would require the actual purchase price of
all land sales to be disclosed and shown on the deed.
6. A provision for recordation of deeds and all transfers of in-
terest in land.
7. A provision providing for accurate recordkeeping by the
commission of all land sales which would provide the necessary
information for compilation of appropriate statistical data.
8. A provision providing for periodic appraisals on land and
publication of such appraisals.
9. A provision for recording fees which could be used to defray
the cost of the commission.
It should be pointed out that this proposal is intentionally general,
and is intended only as possible suggestions for an alternative to the
present provision in the Northern Marianas constitution. The pro-
posal may seem unduly paternalistic, but certainly not any more pa-
ternalistic than the present constitutional provision. One might well
argue that neither is needed; but that decision should be left to the
people themselves to determine.
The purpose of this paper has not been to question the wisdom
of the underlying philosophy of the nonalienation of land provision,
but rather, to emphasize its inherent legal weaknesses and to suggest
alternatives. In so doing, an effort has been made to indicate the
weaknesses of the present constitutional provisions and to point out
the weaknesses of the doctrine of "incorporation," so that steps can
be taken to correct measures which are based on principles which
are not consistent with the principles of the United States Constitu-
tion and which are justified solely on the reliance that, under the
doctrine of "incorporation," the United States Constitution will
never apply fully to this new Commonwealth. It should be
remembered that poor constitutional principles are often the subject
of change at the Supreme Court.
VII. CONCLUSION
The position has been taken here, that certain "innovations"
contained in the constitution of the Northern Mariana Islands are
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not justified as they depend upon the doctrine of "incorporation" for
their validity. Since that doctrine states that the United States Con-
stitution does not apply fully to the territories, and since the doc-
trine results in unequal treatment under the law and diminishes the
Rule of Law, it has no place in modern society. The doctrine of "in-
corporation" can and does result in different classes of citizenship
based solely on the superficial fact of residency and whether a par-
ticular locale is designated a state or a territory, and if a territory,
whether it is "incorporated" or "unincorporated." Further, the doc-
trine leads to the extreme result that a noncitizen (alien) is often
given more rights under our Constitution than is a citizen who hap-
pens to live in a so-called "unincorporated" territory. Territorial
constitutional "innovations" which attempt to encourage and permit
otherwise unconstitutional activities by invocation of the doctrine of
"incorporation" should be struck down as unconstitutional. To do
otherwise will result in an unhealthy duality and a consequent weak-
ening of the Rule of Law.
If there were ever justifications for such a doctrine, surely these
justifications are no longer valid in the modem world. Historically,
the doctrine was justified by the remoteness of the territories and the
vast differences in culture. These justifications are not valid today
where all the territories have television, direct communications with
the States, automobiles, jet airplane transportation, and when many
of the inhabitants have high school and college education, and
where virtually all speak and understand English.
Many of the more noble goals of the people of the territories,
such as protecting their customs and traditions, can be accom-
plished by the use of appropriate legislation and there is no need for
resort to unconstitutional or "extra-constitutional" solutions. By ap-
plying the Constitution fully to the territories these more noble
desires can in fact be better assured. For example, although a jury
trial may not be part of the culture of the people, can it reasonably
be argued that an American judge sitting in a territory will do more
to protect the custom and values of the people than would a jury of
the people? Certainly not.
Thus, this paper has challenged the value of the doctrine of "in-
corporation" and the value of constitutional "innovations" in a dif-
ferent cultural setting. To the extent that Willens and Siemer have
advocated such results in their article, this author has taken excep-
tion with that article. There are numerous different "cultural set-
tings" within the fifty states: there are Black, Chicano, Jewish, and
Chinese communities; there is the Southwest, and the Northeast;
there are mountains, and deserts - none of which justify less than
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the full application of the Constitution within the fifty states based
on the argument that different ethnic groups or different landscapes
justify different constitutional standards. When the people of the
Northern Marianas become citizens of the United States, the fact
that there may exist some cultural and environmental differences
should not work to deny the people their full constitutional rights
under the guise that different cultural settings justify different con-
stitutional standards.

